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pAbstract
The political and financial investments in the implementation of forensic DNA
databases and the ethical issues related to their use and expansion justify inquiries
into their performance and general utility. The main function of a forensic DNA
database is to produce matches between individuals and crime scene stains, which
requires a constant input of individual profiles and crime scene stains. This is
conditioned, among other factors, by the legislation, namely the criteria for inclusion
of profiles and the periods of time and conditions for their retention and/or deletion.
This article aims to provide an overview of the different legislative models for DNA
databasing in Europe and ponder if wider inclusion criteria – and, consequently,
database size – translates into more matches between profiles of crime scene stains
and included individuals (performance ratio). The legislation governing forensic DNA
databases in 22 countries in the European Union was analysed in order to propose a
typology of two major groups of legislative criteria for inclusion/retention of profiles
that can be classified as having either expansive effects or restrictive effects. We
argue that expansive criteria for inclusion and retention of profiles do not necessarily
translate into significant gains in output performance.
Keywords: Forensic genetics; DNA database; Crime; Criminal law; Proportionality;
Europe; Prüm decisionIntroduction
Forensic DNA databases constitute an important investigative resource in contempor-
ary criminal justice systems. The centralised and computerised storage of DNA profiles
in a database enables the systematic comparison and automated matching of crime
scene samples and individual profiles. A forensic DNA database may help criminal
investigators to establish links between a particular suspect of a specific crime and
other unsolved crimes, or can provide support to identify potential suspects while
clearing other suspects in the early stages of an investigation (Cutter 2006; Kaye 2006).
In other words, forensic DNA databasing came to enable an active rather than reactive
use of DNA technologies in criminal investigations (Williams and Johnson 2005).
Thus, according to Chris Asplen (2004), forensic DNA databases allow for a “conserva-
tion of resources”, either by enabling crimes to be solved more quickly, or by speeding up
the judicial proceedings by consolidating the evidence or introducing plea bargaining1.
There is also the argument that forensic DNA databases have the potential to prevent
and deter crime (Cutter 2006), and this has been proclaimed in various jurisdictions as aSantos et al.; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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noted by some authors that the potential deterrent effect and utility of a forensic DNA
database has to take into account characteristics of criminal behaviour (e.g. Kazemian
et al. 2010) and adaptations to forensic circumstances (e.g. (Beauregard and Bouchard
2010), and also that a DNA profile in a database may only be useful for a relatively short
period of time – either because some criminal offenders in the database may have already
ended their “criminal career”, or because those who have only just begun their criminal
career may commit a variety of crimes for some time before their profile is identified and
included in the database (Leary and Pease 2003; McCartney 2006).
The perceived value of forensic DNA analysis and databasing led the European Coun-
cil to issue in February 1992 the non-binding Recommendation No. R (92) 1, in which
it proposed a framework for the use of DNA in policies and legislation pertaining to
European criminal justice systems (Council of Europe 1992). Most Member States have
sought at least to produce legislation to regulate national forensic DNA databases, with
rather distinct orientations on the establishment of criteria for inclusion and retention
of profiles. At present, a considerable investment is being made in reinforcing inter-
national cooperation and exchanging genetic information in order to combat crime and
terrorism, namely via the transposition into European law of the provisions contained
in the Prüm Treaty (EU Council 2008a, 2008b). While the necessary technological har-
monisation is being achieved (Schneider 2009), differences in inclusion and retention
criteria of the EU countries’ forensic DNA databases challenge standardisation regard-
ing the retention of the profiles of children and innocent people, as well as the Treaty’s
legitimacy and acceptability, or the lack of transparent disclosure of its operations
(Prainsack and Toom 2013; McCartney et al. 2011). The construction of the Prüm
regime can also generate power shifts in local practices, structures and actors, in what
Prainsack and Toom (2010) have called dis/empowering effects. The authors exemplify
by saying that while the Prüm regime can be empowering by actually reducing the
circulation of personal information and providing benefits for crime victims, it can also
prioritise the allocation of resources to certain crimes where biological traces are more
likely to be found in detriment of others (Prainsack and Toom 2010).
Implementation and expansion of forensic DNA databases have been supported by
success stories which emphasise the neutral and objective role of DNA technology in
the resolution of crimes, while its limitations and ambiguities tend to go unnoticed in
these narratives (Prainsack and Toom 2013). These stories tend to be grounded on two
principles of what Robin Williams calls “forensic imaginary” – it is always possible to
uniquely identify any object; and that any physical contact between two individuals
implies transference of traces (Williams 2010: 135). Nevertheless, there is still insuffi-
cient evidence on the overall utility of forensic DNA databases, their impact in criminal
deterrence or in securing convictions and, particularly, on the advantages of retaining
profiles of people who were “at the wrong place, at the wrong time” (Cutter 2006;
McCartney 2012; Human Genetics Commission 2009).
Two main types of studies have contributed to the analysis of the use of forensic science:
studies that analyze the impact and effectiveness of physical evidence in criminal justice
proceedings, and studies that focus on evaluating the performance of DNA databases.
There is a large body of empirical research on the use and relevance of physical evidence
for the identification and prosecution of criminals, mostly developed in jurisdictions like
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extensive review by Ludwig and Fraser (2013) and, among published academic and institu-
tional research about forensic science, also includes research studies that have focused on
the effectiveness of DNA technologies in criminal investigations. The review of these
studies indicates that it is important to “distinguish successes in individual cases from
systematic benefits”, since most studies indicate that the effective use of forensic science is
not consistent with general beliefs about its value (Ludwig and Fraser 2013: 6). This review
also indicates the lack of systematic studies with robust experimental designs. As such, it
illustrates the complexities and many caveats inherent to research on the effective use
of forensic science and identifies limitations pertaining to methodological approaches,
opportunistic sampling, demographical and geographical circumscription of the research,
among others.
Wilson et al. (2010) have also focused on the effectiveness of DNA testing in criminal
investigations by engaging in a systematic review of a selection of five field studies
which included Roman et al.’s (Roman et al. 2008), Briody’s (2004), Schroeder’s (2007),
Dunsmuir et al.’s (2008), and Tully’s (1998). While these studies provide empirical
evidence of the relevance and value of DNA technologies for criminal investigation,
they also expose the problematic aspects of engaging in an empirical study of this matter,
like sample selection bias or generalizability of the results.
With increasing proportions of the population included in forensic DNA databases, seve-
ral authors suggested that more research should be aimed at finding ways to evaluate and
monitor their performance (Bieber 2006; Toom 2012; Walsh et al. 2008, 2010; McCartney
2006; Leary and Pease 2003). In this second group of literature that sought to construct
measures for assessing the performance of DNA databases there is the work of the forensic
scientists Schneider and Martin (2001) who made a first assessment of European forensic
DNA databases, stating that the value of forensic DNA databases, in terms of matches, was
related to their number of records (Schneider and Martin 2001). However, there are mul-
tiple factors that can affect the performance of DNA databases and Frederick Bieber (2006)
critically analysed several metrics and dimensions of utility to evaluate DNA databases.
The author indicates that two metrics that have been used to measure the success of DNA
databases, like “counting hits” and “investigations aided”, while interesting, have limited
value in assessing the overall effectiveness, concluding that there should be more research
into actual impacts on case outcomes, such as evaluating relevance for case resolution, the
reduction of investigative costs or the exoneration of suspects (Bieber 2006).
Focusing on DNA database operation, Simon Walsh et al. (2008, 2010) have
sought to construct a model to assess DNA database performance and to evaluate and
measure their output. These authors recognise that the evaluation and comparison of
databases can be affected by several factors, like size and age of the database, as well as
criminal behaviour and career span of the individuals whose profiles are included in
the database. Moreover, the authors stress that “a limitation of any assessment of effect-
iveness is that only crude measures of return are available” (Walsh et al. 2008: 668).
Nevertheless, Walsh et al.’s (2010) model suggests two critical parameters that are fun-
damental to optimise the performance of forensic DNA databases – the selection of
included persons and crime scene stains.
Although acknowledging the limited significance of measuring the number of hits/
matches obtained from a forensic DNA database for its wider impact in the criminal
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son among several jurisdictions. Additionally, the main factor involved in the operation
of DNA databases is their legislative regulation, which is upstream from actual practices
in the forensic evidentiary chain, which were not considered in this analysis. Thus, it is
not the purpose of this article to measure the effectiveness of DNA databases, but ra-
ther to provide a wider consideration of the different criteria for inclusion and reten-
tion of profiles and their effects in terms of the relation between the included
population and the number of matches produced. This approach is inherently limited
because it does not contemplate actual inclusion and retention practices, only princi-
ples stated by law.
DNA databases in some jurisdictions retain the profiles of individuals who were never
matched to a crime scene stain or, in some cases, were never formally accused of any
punishable offense. Nevertheless, since legislation in some countries may allow for the
inclusion in a database of DNA profiles of people who were never convicted or even
formally accused as a suspect, these individuals can become symbolically and biologic-
ally categorised as a “risk” for the rest of the law-abiding population, and also searched
as “suspects” for all future crimes (Simoncelli 2006). Bearing in mind a humanistic
paradigm for offender rehabilitation, forensic DNA databases emerge as an important
part of a biosurveillance apparatus which can be characterized, as Deleuze stated on his
“Postscript on the Societies of Control” as a “limitless postponement” (Deleuze 1992).
In other words, forensic DNA databasing enables a “morally accepted” inscription of
suspicion (Lynch and McNally 2009), which can in some cases last indefinitely, insofar
as an impersonal trace of the body is retained and previous suspects must “prove inno-
cence” by not matching crime scene stains (Dahl and Sætnan 2009).
This article intends to contribute to the ongoing debate about forensic DNA data-
bases, by considering European legislative dispositions that regulate these databases
and analysing the person-stain match ratio in relation with the size of the database in
European countries. First, we propose a typology based on an analysis of the conditions
prescribed in the legislation that regulates the functioning of forensic DNA databases
in 22 countries2 in the European Union (EU). This typology is drawn from the criteria
for the inclusion of profiles and the periods of time and conditions for their retention
and/or deletion. Second, by aggregating two major groups of countries where the legis-
lation is classified as having either expansive or restrictive effects in terms of the pro-
spective size of the forensic databases, we pondered if wider inclusion criteria renders a
larger proportion of matches between profiles of crime scene stains and included
individuals.
Methods
Between October and December 2011, the authors collected information publicly avail-
able on the Internet for a comparative analysis of the legislation regulating the func-
tioning of forensic DNA databases in the EU countries (listed in Additional file 1). In
April 2013, the sources of the legislation were checked and no changes were found.
The analysis of the legislation was carried out in terms of the criteria for the inclusion
and removal of DNA profiles, namely: the type of crime committed; the maximum
length of the potential sentence; the characteristics of the individual concerned and
his/her likelihood of re-offending; and the periods and conditions for retention of
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according to its expansive effects or restrictive effects in terms of the prospective size of
the forensic DNA databases (Tables 1 and 2).Table 1 Criteria for the inclusion and removal of profiles in the restrictive group of countries
Country Criteria for inclusion of profiles Criteria for removal of profiles
Belgium Suspects and individuals convicted of serious
crimes (list)
Convicted offenders – 30 years after inclusion;
profiles in the "criminal investigation" database
deleted when no longer needed
France Suspects and individuals convicted of serious
crimes (list)
Convicted offenders – 40 years after end of
sentence or after individuals reach the age of
80; suspects – removed when retention is no
longer considered necessary by a law official (or
at the request of the party concerned)
Germany Official suspects charged with crimes and
individuals convicted of serious crimes or
re-offending with other crimes
Profiles reviewed 10 years (adults), 5 years
(young people) or 2 years (children) after
inclusion. Removal of profiles of convicted
offenders depends of a court decision
Hungary Convicted offenders and individual suspected
of crimes punishable with a sentence of >
5 years (or listed crimes involving lower
sentences, such as drug trafficking)
Suspects – deleted after acquittal; convicted
offenders – 20 after sentence has been served
Ireland Suspects, convicted offenders (crimes punishable
with a sentence of > 5 years or specific crimes
involving lower sentences) and ex-convicts
Profiles of suspects acquitted or not charged
removed after 10 years, or 5 years in the case of
minors. Convicted offenders – indefinite retention
Italy Individuals arrested, remanded in custody and
convicted of premeditated crimes
Individuals arrested and remanded in custody –
deleted on acquittal; convicted offenders –
20 years after the incident that led to sampling.
No profile may be held for more than 40 years
Luxemburg Individuals suspected of any crime (only by
order of the court dealing with the case);
convicted offenders – included only if
sentenced for listed crimes or by order of the
solicitor or court dealing with the case
Suspects –after acquittal, prescription of the
crime or 10 years after death; convicted
offenders – 10 years after death
The
Netherlands
Suspects and individuals convicted of offenses
or crimes for which preventative custody is
allowed, or by a judicial order.
Convicted offenders – 30 years after sentencing if
the crime is punishable with > 6 years or 20 after
death; 20 years if < 6 years or 12 after death;
Suspects and convicted of sexual offenses against
minors – 80 years. Retention may be extended in
the event of a new conviction; Suspects – DNA
profiles are removed if they are not prosecuted or
convicted (unless a match is found in the DNA
database).
Poland Suspects and convicted offenders (listed crimes) Suspects – deleted after acquittal; convicted
offenders – after 35 years
Portugal Individuals convicted of premeditated crimes
with an effective prison sentence of 3 years or
more, by court order
Convicted offenders – until criminal record annulled
Romania Suspects and convicted offenders (listed crimes) Suspects – removed when retention no longer
considered necessary by the courts or Public
Prosecution; convicted offenders – retained
until aged 60 (in the event of the death of the
individual, retained for a further 5 years)
Spain Individuals detained and those convicted of
serious crimes (list)
Individuals detained – data deleted on
prescription of crimea; individuals convicted –
on date of prescription of criminal record
(unless a court order states otherwise)
Sweden Convicted offenders receiving non-financial
sentences of over 2 years
Suspects – removed after acquittal; convicted
offenders – 10 years after sentence served
aThe period of prescription for the crime applies to individuals who are detained and for whom the judicial proceedings
do not result in acquittal or conviction.
Table 2 Criteria for the inclusion and removal of profiles in expansive group of countries
Country Criteria for inclusion of profiles Criteria for removal of profiles
Austria Individuals suspected and/or convicted
of a dangerous assaulta
Convicted: 5 years after death or at 80 years of
age if the individual has not been forensically
identified in the last 5 years; Minors: removed if
s/he is not forensically identified in the previous
three years; Acquitted suspects have to apply for
removal and/or the authorities will decide if the
acquitted suspect’s profile is no longer necessary.
Denmark Suspects and individuals convicted of
crimes punishable by sentences of >
1 year and 6 months
Convicted offenders – 2 years after death or
at 80 years of age; suspects – 10 years after
acquittal, at 70 years of age, 2 years after death
Estonia Suspects and convicted offenders Suspects and convicted offenders −10 years
after death
Finland Individuals suspected of crimes punishable
with a sentence of > 6 months and
offenders receiving sentences of > 3 years
Suspects – 1 year after acquittal (on the order
of a legal officer) or 10 years after death;
convicted offenders – 10 years after death
Latvia Suspects and convicted offenders – any crime Convicted offenders – 75 years; suspects –
10 years after verdict, if acquitted
Lithuania Suspects and convicted offenders – any
crime – and those temporarily detained
100 years after inclusion or 10 years after the
death of the suspect or convicted offender
Scotland Individuals detained for any crime Suspects – deletion after acquittal or
extension of retention period in cases of
relevant sexual or violent offences; convicted
offenders – indefinite retention
Slovakia Suspects and convicted offenders – any crime Convicted offenders – 100 years after the
date of birth of the individual concerned;
suspects – removal after acquittal
United Kingdom
(England, Wales)b
Individuals detained for any recordable offence Indefinite retention
aIn Austria, as defined in Section 16 (2) of the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz [Security Police Act], serious crimes are understood
to be any threat against a legal asset by committing a premeditated crime punishable by law. In addition to the type of
crime, the profile of an individual may be included when “the police cite the nature of the crime or the ‘personality’ of
the respective individual as grounds for expecting them to reoffend” (Prainsack and Kitzberger 2009).
bThe S. & Marper v. UK decision of the ECHR is reflected on the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 in England and Wales,
which will require all DNA samples to be destroyed within six months of being taken. It will still allow for speculative
searches on the DNA profiles of non-convicted individuals, but eliminates their indefinite retention by establishing reten-
tion periods (until three years, plus two years if extended by court decision) differentiated according to the seriousness
of the suspected offence. By October 2013, the Act will officially come into force.
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freely via the Internet, we consulted the original legislative texts in digital format. For
the purposes of this article, the Czech Republic was excluded because it was not pos-
sible to find the relevant documentation3, and because the existing legislation (Police
Act – Zákona o Policii [Law on Police] č. 283/1991) does not distinguish the dimen-
sions required for comparison with the other countries. Estonia, Germany, Latvia,
Lithuania and the Netherlands provide authorised English translations of the legislation,
which facilitated reading and interpretation. In the eight cases in which documentation
was only available in a language unfamiliar for the authors (Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden), Google Translate™ (http://translate.
google.com), an automatic translation application available on the Internet, was used.
The serious limitations of publicly available data from the Internet were taken into con-
sideration, and therefore the obtained information was systematically compared with
other sources, namely reports produced by relevant agencies, such as Governmental
bodies, professional and forensic experts associations, civil society groups and ethics
councils (Scottish Government 2011; Bidasolo et al. 2009; Ministry of Justice 2007;
Asplen 2012; Martin et al. 2001; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007; Council for Re-
sponsible Genetics 2011; Williams and Johnson 2005; Camp and Dierickx 2007).
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formance and efficiency parameters of forensic DNA databases. The authors found that
the best independent measure of a database’s performance is obtained by dividing the
number of hits by the product of the total individuals in the database and the number
of crime scene samples. However, the ENFSI DNA Working Group (ENFSI 2012)
argues that such measure wrongly suggests that larger databases are less efficient than
smaller databases, because the result is always inversely proportional to the size of the
database. Therefore, this group proposes two different performance parameters: the
number of stain-to-person-matches relative to the number of persons included in the
DNA database; and the number of stain-to-person-matches relative to the number of
stains included in the DNA database (ENFSI 2012).
For the purpose of our analysis we chose to use the first parameter to compare the
databases’ performance due to the limitations pertaining to the relevance of the stains
in a database (Walsh et al. 2010), as well as the differences in actual deletion protocols
for different countries (ENFSI 2012). Additionally, because the proposed typology
focuses on the criteria that affects the number of included individuals and not on the
quantity of crime scene stains.
Hence, the contents of Table 3 were adapted from a report produced by the European
Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) DNA Working Group (ENFSI 2012) andTable 3 Population and DNA database performance
Country Total
population
Total no.
individuals
included
in DNA
database
Proportion
(%) of
population
included in
database
Total no.
crime
scene
stains
Person-
stain
matches
Date of
data
collection
Performance
ratio
RESTRICTIVE
Belgium 10.400.000 22.871 0.22% 26.237 1.886 Dec-11 0.08
France 64.300.000 1.873.016 2.91% 120.111 53.595 Dec-11 0.03
Germany 81.835.000 746.912 0.91% 201.955 99.974 Dec-11 0.13
Hungary 9.982.000 90.275 0.90% 2.264 240 Dec-11 0.00
Luxemburg 500.000 877 0.18% 662 200 Dec-11 0.23
Netherlands 16.100.000 130.067 0.81% 49.158 29.792 Dec-11 0.23
Poland 38.200.000 28.376 0.07% 2483 147 Dec-11 0.01
Romania 22.000.000 13906 0.06% 696 43 Dec-11 0.00
Spain 44.800.000 192.835 0.43% 59.761 20.671 Feb-12 0.11
Sweden 9.000.000 107.130 1.19% 23.539 32.144 Dec-11 0.30
EXPANSIVE
Austria 8.100.000 151811 1.87% 48411 14.809 Dec-11 0.10
Denmark 5.500.000 77.500 1.41% 40.518 20.738 Sep-11 0.27
Estonia 1.400.000 29.274 2.09% 9.376 2.860 Jul-09 0.10
Finland 5.402.145 119.383 2.21% 13.296 14.779 Dec-11 0.12
Latvia 2.400.000 37037 1.54% 2092 761 Dec-11 0.02
Lithuania 3.169.000 55.561 1.75% 4.204 1.558 Dec-11 0.03
Scotland 5.062.000 236.202 4.67% 9.987 18.410 Jul-08 0.08
Slovakia 5.500.000 29.474 0.54% 6.686 3.454 Dec-11 0.12
United Kingdom
(England and Wales)
53.700.000 5.508.170 10,26% 390.275 1.710.391 Dec-11 0.31
Note: The countries that did not provide sufficient data on the date when the information was collected by the ENFSI
(Ireland, Italy and Portugal) have been excluded from this table.
Source: Adapted from ENFSI (2011).
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lated from the most recent available data which dates from December 2011 (ENFSI
2011). This single parameter aims to indicate the performance of a DNA database by
dividing the number of matches between individuals and crime scene stains by the total
number of individuals included in the database (ENFSI 2012). Higher performance
ratios can suggest that crime scene stains are being carefully selected and that the in-
clusion and retention criteria of the profiles of individuals are proportionately adequate.
Thus, it can provide an indication whether the “right” people are being included in the
database and/or irrelevant profiles are being deleted.
Results
Databases of all the analysed countries are used for criminal investigation purposes. In
three of the countries – Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands – the law specifically
states that DNA analysis and comparison is made exclusively for the purposes of identi-
fication of persons who are, directly or indirectly, involved in a crime.
Considering the criteria for the inclusion and removal of DNA profiles from forensic
databases stated on legislation of the 22 EU countries analysed in this article, it was pos-
sible to identify two main groups: countries with legislation classified as having expansive
effects (Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Scotland, Slovakia, and the
United Kingdom (England and Wales)); and countries with legislation classified as having
restrictive effects (Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden). The characterisation of the
two groups of legislation is described in Table 1 (restrictive countries) and Table 2 (expan-
sive countries).
In the group of countries in which legislation is considered to have restrictive effects,
the condition generally imposed for the inclusion of profiles in databases is that an in-
dividual is suspected or convicted of a crime that involves a potential or effective prison
sentence, or the fact that the individual subjected to a collection of a biological sample
has committed crimes that are considered serious (Table 1).
The criteria for inclusion and removal of profiles of the expansive countries are sum-
marised in Table 2. This group is distinguished from the restrictive countries’ group for
its comparatively lower thresholds for inclusion and lengthier retention periods for pro-
files, which may allow for a faster expansion in the number of profiles in the DNA
database. In the expansive group, the inclusion criteria in most countries allow that in-
dividuals suspected of any crime can be submitted to sample collection and, conse-
quently, to the inclusion of their respective DNA profiles in the forensic database. The
exceptions are Denmark and Finland, where profile inclusion is associated with poten-
tial sentences, that is, the maximum prison sentence that may be given to an individual
if convicted for a particular crime. The legislative configurations of the expansive coun-
tries appear to indicate the option increase the number of included individuals in the
DNA database in order to enhance the number of person-stain matches. The basis for
this option could be the argument that individuals who commit minor crimes or are
identified as mere suspects may be involved in more serious crimes in the future.
Moreover, that by creating legislative conditions for the expansion of a DNA database
not only would improve the efficiency of criminal investigations but would also be
likely to serve as a deterrent to crime (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007).
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lower number of individuals (and/or the proportion of the total population) and crime
scene stains included in the databases, respectively (Table 3). Differences in the median
performance ratio were compared by the Mann–Whitney test, and they were not statis-
tically significant (restrictive vs expansive: 0.095 vs. 0.100, p = 0.567).
Available data do not support the idea according to which the size or the proportion
of the total population that is included in a forensic DNA database is linked to its out-
put in terms of measured person-stain matches (Figure 1).
Discussion
The comparative analysis of the legislation that regulates the functioning of forensic DNA
databases in 22 countries in the European Union emphasised a distinction between what
we have argued to be expansive and restrictive effects, since the proportion of the popula-
tion included in the expansive group is generally larger than in the restrictive group
(Table 3). Previous studies have sought to assess and measure the effectiveness of the con-
tribution of forensic science to criminal justice and the efficiency of DNA databases. As
discussed in the introduction, there is a lack of systematic empirical research studies, and
studies made to date stress the conceptual and methodological complexity of assessing the
actual impacts of forensic science and DNA technology in justice systems. Moreover, most
research has been centred on jurisdictions like England and Wales, the USA and Australia.
This aim of this article is not to provide a different method to measure or assess the impact
of DNA databases, but rather to analyse European countries’ legislative criteria for inclu-
sion and retention of profiles and then to consider the effects in terms of the association
between the number of individuals included and the number of person-stain matches.
By comparing the performance ratio with the proportion of the population included
(Figure 1) the data show that a DNA database’s performance in terms of person-stain
matches is not linked to its size in terms of individuals included. The countries with
the highest proportion of their population included in the database do not necessarily0.00
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Figure 1 Scatter plot of the performance ratio and proportion of population from expansive and
restrictive countries.
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lower proportion of included individuals. In other words, a high “performance ratio” of
person-stain matches per person indicates that the “right” people are being included in
the database (ENFSI 2012), meaning that the included individuals are the ones that
present a good chance of matching crime scene stains.
There are limits to this comparison, since it does not account for local police and
forensic practices and contingencies in the application of the legislation, and because it
does not take into account the date of implementation of the databases, methods of
match counting, crime rates or policy changes over time.
Nevertheless, the proposed classification of expansive and restrictive effects of the le-
gislation is still valid insofar it emphasizes the underlying principles and envisioned
purposes of the diverse European forensic DNA databases. Furthermore, by considering
the proportion of population included and the number of person-stain matches per
person, it can also be useful to ponder if there is a relevant association between them,
insofar it may raise the question of the proportionality of the inclusion and retention
criteria prescribed in the DNA database legislation of the “expansive” countries
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007). This is particularly relevant since automated
DNA searches and exchange of information between EU countries was enacted into
EU law through the so-called Prüm decisions. As such, a virtual EU forensic DNA data-
base constructed with different legislative understandings of proportionality, bodily
integrity, right to individual privacy and presumption of innocence, may present an
example of increasing inequalities among EU’s “biological citizens” (Plows and Boddington
2006; Prainsack and Toom 2013). The S. & Marper v. UK decision of the ECHR, which
binds the signatory countries to its ruling, is thus far the most important decision regard-
ing DNA databases in Europe. It argues against the NDNAD’s blanket and indiscriminate
retention of DNA samples and profiles of non-convicted individuals under the justifica-
tion of the database’s expansion in order to enhance public protection. In the ECHR’s
view, the indefinite retention of non-convicted person’s data is stigmatizing and interferes
with the individual right to privacy. Thus, the S. & Marper v. UK decision of the ECHR
demands that the contracting states must find a fair balance between the competing
public and private interests.
While, intuitively, one would agree with Schneider and Martin’s (2001) statement that
the value of a forensic DNA database is associated to its number of records, it would
appear that at least one dimension of utility – identifying offenders from stains col-
lected at crime scenes – might depend more on the characteristics of the individuals
that are registered rather than on their number, which is largely conditioned by the
existing governing legislation.
The success of a considerable number of person-stain matches in the first operational
years of databases can be compared to the initial success of the exchange of informa-
tion between some members of the Prüm Treaty when many unidentified crime scene
stains were identified, allowing cross-border crimes to be solved (McCartney et al.
2011). Similarly, the establishment of a forensic DNA database can provide useful
intelligence for solving earlier crimes once crime scene stains are loaded and compared
to the profiles of included individuals. For example, an old stain collected at the scene
of an unsolved case of a robbery can be matched to the profile of an individual who is
presently being charged or convicted for other crimes.
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http://www.lsspjournal.com/content/9/1/12Therefore, we conclude that while, theoretically, the effort to maximise the number
of included individuals in a forensic DNA database would appear to be an effective
strategy to enhance its value and utility, the comparison of person-stain match figures
in the context of the typology proposed in this article would indicate that the expansion
of a forensic DNA database does not necessarily translate into greater output perform-
ance in terms of person-stain matches. Hence, it is our understanding that there is a
need for further studies on the actual criminological and judicial impacts of forensic
DNA profiling and databasing.
Endnotes
1Plea bargaining tends to be associated with adversarial legal systems and refers to
negotiations involving an admission of guilt by the accused in return for more
favourable treatment by the courts. This process has been criticised on the grounds
that it negates the principle of presumption of innocence and increases the risk of an
innocent person being convicted, particularly when they do not believe they have much
chance of being acquitted due to the fact that they are economically disadvantaged
and/or a member of an ethnic minority group (Siegel 2010).
2Scotland has its own legislation and a DNA database that is separate from the
United Kingdom (England and Wales) database. For the purposes of this paper, infor-
mation on Scotland is therefore treated as belonging to a separate country and is con-
sidered separately from information on the United Kingdom.
3Since the original legislation could not be found, searches were made using other
sources. However, it was not possible to find the Police President Binding Instruction
No. 88/2004 referred to in Camp and Dierickx (Camp and Dierickx 2007).
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